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Abstract. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a critical factor in development of SADC. However, corruption remains to be an obstacle 
to economic transformation in these countries. Empirically, studies provide controversial results on the impact of corruption on FDI. 
Some studies conclude that corruption negatively impacts FDI inflows in a country, while others provide evidence that corruption can 
act as a ‘helping hand’ to FDI inflows in a country. Given this ambiguity in the results of previous studies, utilizing a panel data set for 
the period 2000-2016 for 15 SADC countries, the study examines the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in these countries. Lack of 
attention in previous studies on the effect of corruption on FDI inflows in SADC motivated this research. Estimation results using a robust 
random effects model show that when corruption is widespread in a country, foreign investors are reluctant to invest. Thus, corruption 
negatively affects FDI inflows in SADC countries. The study recommends that SADC countries should develop and implement efficient, 
effective, and strong anti-corruption measures to reduce corruption and hence increase FDI inflows.  
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 Introduction 
This study is an econometric analysis of the 
influence of corruption on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows in Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) countries. FDI inflows are key in 
creating employment opportunities, providing capital, 
and improving productivity. UNCTAD (2014) defines 
FDI as the amount of equity capital that a country 
receives, as shown in the balance of payment. 
Competition for FDI has increasingly intensified, and 
host nations strive to attract FDI by providing fiscal 
incentives and the necessary infrastructure to post 
themselves as attractive investment destinations.  
Despite the progressive and well-intended 
overtures, most SADC countries face some negative 
governance issues that militate against their efforts to 
land lucrative investors. Chief among these is 
corruption, a scourge that permeates governance 
structure in both public and private offices. Corruption 
is the exploitation of the public office for personal 
gain. Corruption is an additional cost to businesses and 
a tax on profits and dampens FDI inflows, thereby 
hindering economic growth in developing countries 
(Ali-Sadig, 2009). While investors consider tax and 
non-tax factors in choosing an investment destination, 
corruption attracts more attention. Consequently, most 
investors will consider, foremost, the host country’s 
corruption levels in making foreign investment 
decisions. On the other hand, governance structures 
that have deliberate measures in place to curb 
corruption are more likely to attract foreign 
investment than loose national governance structures. 
Unfortunately, existing literature shows that less 
consideration is given to a very important issue that is, 
solving the problem of corruption, particularly in 
developing countries. Practical proof of the effect of 
corruption on FDI inflows is relatively inadequate 
despite the huge literature on the causes of FDI. A 
worrying phenomenon is that there is a likelihood of 
investors to willingly or unwillingly participate in 
corrupt processes as part of their strategies against 
competing fellow investors. Most previous studies on 
the effects of corruption on FDI included very few 
African countries, yet African countries are ranked 
very low on the global corruption perception index. 
The irony is that most African economies are endowed 
with abundant natural resources and therefore attract 
investors, yet their weak governance structures expose 
them to local or inbound corruption involving 
investment contracts and deals. 
According to the researchers’ information, there are 
very few empirical studies on the impact of corruption 
on FDI inflows in SADC countries. Furthermore, most 
previous studies used a cross-sectional data approach 
to investigate the impact of corruption on FDI inflows 
in a host country. This method or approach fails to 
govern for the unnoticed country-specific effects that 
vary across nations interrelated with corruption. It 
should be noted that Africa and SADC in particular, 
despite its rich natural resource base, especially 
minerals, has received the lowest proportion of FDI 
inflows to developing countries. In addition, it suffers 
from a proverbial resource curse. Some reasons have 
been put forward, including high levels of corruption, 
political instability, and small market size, among 
others. 
Both empirical and theoretical evidence suggests 
that grant corruption is deleterious to FDI inflows. 
However, statistics on FDI inflows and corruption 
levels for SADC member states show a distorted 
picture of the association between corruption and FDI 
inflows in these countries.  For example, DR Congo 
and Mozambique ranked as the most corrupt receive 
more FDI inflows than those ranked least corrupt such 
as Botswana and Seychelles. Hence, it is imperative to 
investigate the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 
the region. In that investigation, it could also be 
worthwhile to explore the hypotheses that despite the 
corruption involved in landing investment deals in 
corrupt countries, the cost of doing business pales in 
the face of the gains after that, especially where both 
the investor and the country’s office holders sleep 
between the same pair of sheets. The contra factual is 
that corruption may not necessarily negatively affect 
FDI, but rather, increase the competition among 
potential investors, making a high corruption economy 
an attractive investment destination for two reasons. 
First, high stakes usually point to high gains, and 
second proceeds of the investment can be externalized 
through corruption because the same system that 
facilitates investment through corruption is also 
responsible for the policies governing accountability, 
taxation, and exchange control. 
The study’s principal objective is to investigate the 
effect of corruption on FDI inflows in SADC countries 
and to generate a set of assertions that can be used to 
draw conclusions and recommendations. In this vein, 
the study will attempt to provide answers to the 
following questions: What are the effects of corruption 
on FDI inflows in SADC? Is there a statistically 
significant relationship between corruption and FDI 
inflows? What are the key causes of FDI inflows in 
SADC? The study attempts to address the null 
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hypothesis that the association between corruption and 
FDI inflows is statistically insignificant against the 
alternative hypothesis that the association is 
statistically significant. 
Literature Review 
Overview of Corruption 
The abuse of public office for personal gain is not a 
new problem, and it is a consistent, repetitive, and 
essential part of the set-up of most political systems 
(Iyanda, 2012). Goulb and Kolb (1964) pointed out 
that corruption is prevalent in both dictatorial and 
party systems of the government.  
Akinyemi (2004) described corruption as the 
gaining of that which one, as a public official, is not 
eligible to. On the other hand, Doig (ibid) described it 
to be any use of the authorized position, means, or 
amenities for personal benefit. This definition tallies 
with Transparency International (2009), which 
defined corruption as “the abuse of public office for 
private gain”. According to Al-Sadiq (2009), 
corruption has an impact on the distribution of 
resources and involves the abuse of public or 
collective duty for personal ends. It should be noted 
that corruption also occurs from the giver and 
recipient as if this were a contract. Not all cases of 
corruption emanate from demand, but some also 
emanate from inducements offered to office bearers 
who may not necessarily have set off to abuse their 
office for gain but are inducted into corruption 
because of a weakness in their integrity disposition. 
Three wide categorizations of corruption are not 
mutually exclusive. These are grand corruption, petty 
corruption, and business corruption. Moody-Stuart 
(1997) referred to grand corruption as the abuse of 
public power by heads of state, relevant ministers, and 
top civil servants for private pecuniary profit. Petty 
corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain 
in the course of delivering a public service. It occurs 
at the operation end of politics, where public officials 
interact with the public. Unlike grand corruption, 
which involves large sums of money, petty corruption 
typically comprises trivial amounts of money in the 
form of bribes (grease money or speed money) to 
public officials. Business corruption is not often 
viewed as a crime, but as a means to fast-track 
business processes. Supporters claim that through 
business corruption, red-tape is bypassed and time is 
utilised. Business corruption takes the form of bribes, 
insider trading, money laundering, tax evasion, and 
embezzlement.  
Overview of FDI 
FDI is defined as long-term investment  by a 
resident entity in one economy in an enterprise 
resident in another economy (UNCTAD 2007). There 
are two main classes of FDI, namely macroeconomic 
and microeconomic theories (Makoni, 2015). 
Macroeconomic theories view FDI as a form of the 
movement of capital across national boundaries 
reflected in the balance of payment statistics. 
According to these theories, FDI is determined by 
market size, economic growth rate, GDP, 
infrastructure, natural resources, and institutional and 
non-institutional factors. Microeconomic theories 
examine FDI incentives from the investors’ viewpoint, 
which is similar to taking a company level or industry-
level standpoint in making a decision.  
FDI has its advantages and disadvantages to a host 
country. First, it boosts a country’s economy by 
introducing new goods, foreign technology, and 
creating a stock of knowledge in a receiving nation 
through the transmission of skills (Mahembe and 
Odhiambo, 2013). Second, FDI plays a vital role in 
filling the funding gap between local savings and 
investment requirements and can reduce the need for 
debt capital in a country. However, Sen (1998), is of 
the opinion that MNCs only transfer inappropriate or 
non-strategic technologies, and Moura and Forte 
(2009) argue that host countries can become 
dependent on technologies introduced by MNCs. 
Finally, FDI exerts a far more significant impact on 
imports than exports, which negatively influences the 
balance of payments. 
Theoretical Link between Corruption and FDI 
The link between corruption and FDI is a well-
researched topic, yet there is no conclusive study on 
the effects of corruption on FDI. For this reason, one 
must distinguish between corruption with a negative 
social benefit (corruption as ‘grabbing hand’) and 
corruption with the positive social benefit (corruption 
as ‘helping hand’).  
“The Grabbing hand” theory of corruption claims 
that vice is an enemy of economic activities in that it 
increases the costs of doing business (Alemu, 2012). 
According to this theory, corruption reduces FDI 
inflows and attracts lower-quality investments. A 
survey by TI in 2008 found out that corruption rose the 
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cost of investing by more than ten percent 
(Transparency International, 2009). Government 
incomes become low due to high corruption, which 
may lead to pitiable infrastructure, an element that is 
unattractive for foreign investors (Egger and Winner, 
2005). This form of corruption may attract the kind of 
investor who may not necessarily honor their 
obligations. Even when the host economy does not 
agree with the eventual undesirable economic conduct 
of the investor, their lips are sealed, and their actions 
are incapacitated as they are held at ransom because of 
bribes accepted at the onset of the investment. 
China is placed top of corrupt countries in the 
world, whereas at the same time, it has experienced an 
increase in FDI inflows and is projected by UNCTAD 
to be the most favored destination for FDI. 
Consequently, the ‘helping hand’ theory of corruption 
can be used to explain this phenomenon. Some authors 
argue that corruption can act as a “helping hand” by 
lubricating the rolls of business in the absence of 
strong legal and regulatory frameworks resulting in 
Pareto efficiency (Bardhan, 1997). Tullock (1996) is 
of the opinion that corruption can raise economic 
growth in emerging economies because bribes 
complement low wages, allowing administrations to 
keep the tax burden low. According to economists 
such as Lui (1985) and Saha (2001), corruption can be 
competent ‘lubrication’ for inflexible economic 
regulation and red tape. By corrupting the host 
government, MNCs could sneak regulations and red-
tape and possibly obtain a large amount of benefit 
from the host government regarding lucrative 
contracts, advantaged access to markets that cannot be 
obtained by exporting, which could act as an extra 
motivation for the MNCs to engage in FDI. In this 
regard, it is acknowledged that regardless of 
corruption that facilitates investment, the eventual 
investment may very well proceed to benefit the 
economy. 
Empirical Link between Corruption and FDI  
1. Negative Relationship 
Mauro (1995) concluded that high levels of 
corruption result in low foreign investment. 
Castro and Nunes (2013)suggested that lower 
corruption levels result in greater FDI inflows, 
thereby  suggesting that managing corruption 
may be a vital plan for increasing FDI inflows. 
A study by Quanzi (2014) found out that the 
effect of corruption on FDI is considerably 
negative and strong, which confirms the 
“grabbing hand” proposition. Ogunmuyiwa 
(2012), using the case of Nigeria argued that in 
the long run corruption has adverse influence on 
FDI in line with arguments of the “grabbing 
hand” theory. A study by Azam and Ahmad 
(2013), on the effects of corruption on FDI, 
concluded that (MNCs) tend to shun nations 
with high corruption rates. A study by Al-Sadiq 
(2009) confirmed other previous studies noting 
an adverse association between the corruption 
level and foreign investment inflows. 
Freckleton, Wright, and Craigwell (2011) 
suggested that corruption is now recognised as a 
policy variable that influences aspects of both 
social and economic life. Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002) found out that foreign companies shun 
corruption because it causes inefficiency. A 
study by Wright and Craigwell (2011) found out 
that sufficient institutional facilities must be in 
place in emerging economies to fight corruption 
and increase foreign investment. Alemu (2012) 
concluded that countries with high levels of 
corruption but with remarkable FDI inflows can 
double their foreign investment inflows by 
managing corruption. On the other hand, some 
studies argue that the type of FDI is a vital 
denominator to the input of corruption. For 
instance, Brouthers, Gao, and MacNicol (2008) 
separated market-seeking FDI and resource-
seeking FDI. The study revealed that the 
market-seeking FDI was less sensitive towards 
corruption, while resource-seeking FDI was 
more sensitive to the level of corruption. The 
study concluded that despite having attractive 
resources, high levels of corruption reduce FDI 
inflows. 
2. Positive and Neutral Relationship  
There is ancillary proof that corruption 
lubricates the wheels of business rather than 
sanding them. Egger and Winner (2005) found a 
clear and affirmative relationship between 
corruption and FDI.  Similarly, using fixed 
effects estimation, Hines (1995) also found a 
positive relationship between FDI inflows and 
corruption levels. A study by Mi (2013) found 
out that corruption has no tangible or major 
influence on FDI. In his study, Kim (2010) 
found out that countries with high levels of 
government corruption and low democracy 
receive high FDI inflows. Gutierrez (2015) 
provided evidence that a high level of corruption 
does not effect FDI inflows in Argentina 
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because foreign companies concentrate on the 
exploitation of natural resources. Ackay (2001) 
failed to recognize any significant impact of 
corruption on FDI.  
Other Factors that Influence FDI 
Literature on the factors that influence FDI has 
revealed that corruption is not the only variable that 
affects FDI inflows. In the current study, other factors 
that affect FDI are used as control variables. First, 
market size implies that the bigger the market, the 
more the chances it offers in terms of sales and 
revenues to MNCs (Bissoon, 2011). The market size 
hypothesis points out that FDI is presumed to be a 
function of the size of the target market. Second, the 
infrastructure variable includes roads, ports, railways 
and telecommunications, and energy to institutional 
development (Demirham and Masca, 2008). Jordan 
(2004) claimed that quality infrastructure increases the 
productivity of investments, and therefore encourages 
FDI inflows. Third, openness to trade measures the 
degree to which a country is open to the rest of the 
world. When investment is market seeking, trade 
restraints can have a positive impact on FDI because 
MNCs will set up branches in a host country. In 
contrast, export-oriented FDI favors more open 
economies since increased inadequacies that go 
together with trade protection imply higher transaction 
costs associated with exporting. Fourth, a stable social 
and political environment strongly affects FDI. 
Political instability in a country will reduce the 
profitability of operating in the host country because 
production is disturbed. It also affects the value of the 
host country’s currency, thus decreasing the value of 
the assets capitalized in the host country. Finally, a 
low inflation rate stimulates more investment. 
Contrary, a high inflation rate signals economic 
instability (Ardiyanto, 2012).  
Research Methodology 
Choice of Methodology 
The study utilizes a panel data research 
methodology. The panel data approach combines two 
dimensions: cross-sectional and time series 
dimensions. This gives the researcher many 
observations, thereby increasing the degrees of 
freedom and decreasing collinearity among 
explanatory variables. This improves the effectiveness 
of econometric estimates (Kadenge and 
Madzivanyika, 2015). Panel data helps to account for 
individual heterogeneity across countries, which is not 
possible with time-series and cross-sectional studies. 
Data and Data Sources 
Table 1 
Data and Data Sources 
Description   Data Source Anticipated  
Sign 
FDI  UNCTAD  
GDP per Capita  UNCTAD Positive 
Inflation World Development Indicators (WDI)  
 
Negative 
Openness to Trade  UNCTAD Positive 
Corruption  Transparency International  Negative 
Political Risk  World Governance Indicators /IPRS Negative 
Infrastructure Africa Development Bank  Positive 
Specification of the model 
The Empirical analysis adopts the following model: 
 
LnFDI𝑖𝑡
= β0 + β1LnCorruption𝑖𝑡




+ β6LnOpenness to Trade𝑖𝑡
+  ℯit 
(1) 
Where: 
FDI = Foreign Direct Investment  
inflows as a % of GDP 
Corruption = Corruption Perception Index 
GDP/Capita = GDP per Capita  
(proxy for market share) 
Inflation = Inflation Rate  
(proxy for economic stability) 
Infrastructure = Infrastructure 
Risk = Political risk 
Openness to  
Trade 
= Degree of Openness 
ℯ𝑡 = error term 
β0 = Constant 
β1 … . β6 = Coefficients of the independent  
variables 
i = cross-sectional variations 
t = time variations 
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All the variables are transformed to natural 
logarithms to reduce the risk of heteroskedasticity. 
The study recognizes that FDI decisions may be made 
based on past data.  
Data Presentation and Analysis 
Variable inflation factors (VIF) test results are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
VIF Test Results; Source: Own Calculations 
Explanatory Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Corruption 4.63 0.216 
GDP per Capita 3.24 0.309 
Inflation 2.26 0.442 
Infrastructure 1.82 0.549 
Political Risk 1.48 0.676 
Openness to Trade 1.28 0.783 
Mean VIF 2.45  
 
The following are the diagnostic tests that were 
carried out to prove the vigor of the results obtained. 
First, multicollinearity test results show VIFs 
(Variance inflation factors), which are lower than 10 
and 1/VIFs greater than 0.1. This means that VIF 
quantifies the extent of multicollinearity in a 
regression analysis. They provide an index that 
calculates the variance of a regression coefficient that 
is amplified because of collinearity. There was no 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.  
Second, heteroscedasticity was tested using 
Breusch-Pagan and Cameroon and Trivedi’s 
decomposition of the IM-test. The Breusch-Pagan test 
has a chi-square of  6.41, and a  probability of 0.0113.  
In addition, Cameroon and Trivedi’s decomposition of 
the IM-test has a probability value of 0.0002. The fact 
that the results of these two tests have probabilities 
that are less than 5% implies that the variances of 
residuals are heteroscedastic, and to correct for 
heteroscedasticity, a robust random effects model was 
used.  
Third, the Bruesch-Pangan Lagrangian Multiplier 
Test was used to test for the existence of 
autocorrelation in the estimated model. The results 
show a chi-square of 163.20 and a probability of 
0.2341. This result indicates no autocorrelation in the 
model.  
Finally, to test whether we should use the fixed 
effects model or the random effects model in panel 
data, the study used the Hausman test. The chi-square 
for the Hausman test was found to be 10.13, and its 
probability value was found to be 0.1192. Since the 
probability value of this test is greater than 0.05, this 
means that the research will be based on a random 
effect model. 
Robust random effects model estimates results are 
summarized in Table 2. Wald chi-square is 32.61, 
which means that the coefficients of all independent 
variables are not equal to zero and the probability of 
0.0000 indicates that the model significantly explains 
the relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables.  
Corruption significantly influences FDI in SADC at 
the 5% level of significance in both models estimated. 
The negative influence of corruption on FDI inflows 
decreases when controls are introduced into the 
regression model (see the coefficients). The results are 
in line with many papers, Mauro (1995), Wedeman 
(1997), Teksoz (2004), Ali-Sadig (2009), Freckleton, 
Wright and Craigwell (2011), and Egger and Winner 
(2005) who accepted corruption as a barrier to FDI 
inflow. The coefficient of corruption in the model is 
adverse and confirms previous practical studies on the 
association between corruption and FDI.  
Table 3 
Estimation results 
***1% level of significance, and **5% level of significance 
 
A negative association between FDI and market 
size exists, as indicated by the coefficient . Market size 
is insignificant in influencing FDI inflows in SADC. 
This contradicts many studies that found that market 
size influences FDI. For instance, Indopu (2010) and 
Al-Sadiq (2009) found a positive association between 
host country market size and FDI inflows. Such 
studies concluded that FDI is enticed to a country with 
































Constant -3.45 -2.45** 0.445 
N =236 
Wald χ2 = 32.61 
𝑃rob > χ2 = 0.0000 
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Inflation, a proxy of macroeconomic stability, has a 
negative relationship with FDI. However, its effect is 
statistically insignificant, implying that investors do 
not care much about the macroeconomic environment 
obtaining in a country. The coefficient of inflation is 
negative as expected. The results of this study are 
inconsistent with previous studies such as Indopu 
(2010), and Bissoon (2011) who concluded that 
macroeconomic uncertainty has a noteworthy negative 
impact on FDI. 
Political risk is positively related to FDI inflows. 
This positive association indicates that the political 
environment in a host nation does not bother foreign 
investors or MNCs in SADC. Instead, the more 
politically unstable a host country is, the more FDI it 
receives. However, the association between political 
risk and FDI is insignificant. The result is contrary to 
the expected negative association between political 
risk and FDI. The result also contradicts findings of 
previous researchers. 
Openness to trade is significant in determining or 
influencing FDI inflows in SADC, and its coefficient 
is positive, as expected at the 1% level of significance. 
This implies that good trade policies attract foreign 
direct investment. This result is in line with the 
outcomes of Asiedu (2002), who studied the causes of 
FDI in Africa. Good infrastructure attracts FDI, and 
this is evidenced by the results that show a positive 
relationship between FDI and infrastructure as 
expected. The latter result supports the findings of 
Rahman, Kisunko and Kapoor (2000). However, from 
the estimated regression results, infrastructure is 
statistically insignificant in influencing FDI. In 
addition, Mahembe and Odhiambo (2013) found that 
poor infrastructure negatively affects FDI inflows.  
In summary, the outcomes of the model reveal that 
corruption and openness to trade have a significant 
impact on FDI inflows in SADC. However, empirical 
results show that macroeconomic instability, market 
size, infrastructure, and political risk do have an 
insignificant impact on FDI in SADC.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
There are a few types of research carried out on the 
influence of corruption on FDI inflows in SADC. 
Most research on this topic covers SADC countries 
under umbrella terms such as developing countries 
and Africa. Furthermore, most previous studies used 
cross-sectional and pure time-series analysis to 
investigate the impact of corruption on FDI inflows. 
This research aims at closing this gap by investigating 
the effects of corruption on FDI inflows using the 
robust random effects model on a panel data set of 15 
SADC countries for the period 2000-2016. The 
research objective was to analyze the effect of 
corruption and its statistical significance on FDI 
inflows in SADC. The study concluded that corruption 
has a significant and negative effect on FDI flows to 
SADC countries. This confirms other previous 
studies, Mauro (1995), Wedeman (1997), Teksoz 
(2004), Al-Sadiq (2009), Freckleton, Wright and 
Craigwell (2011), and Egger and Winner (2005), who 
provide some evidence of a negative relationship 
between corruption and FDI. 
The research needed to answer the question “What 
are the key causes of FDI inflows in SADC?” First, on 
the empirical results on the relationship between the 
level of corruption and openness to trade, it can be 
concluded that the lower a country’s score on a scale 
of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt) the less FDI 
it receives. Second, from the positive association 
between openness to trade and FDI inflows, we can 
conclude that the more a country is open to 
international trade the more foreign investment it 
receives. Third, we conclude that macroeconomic 
instability negatively affects the flow of FDI to SADC 
countries though insignificantly. Fourth, we conclude 
that even though infrastructure is positively related to 
FDI, it insignificantly influences the flow of foreign 
investment to SADC, which may imply that foreign 
investors in SADC are not much worried about the 
level of infrastructure development in a host country. 
Finally, we conclude that market size and political risk 
have no influence on FDI in SADC countries. 
On the policy front, the study recommends that 
policymakers in SADC countries should put in place 
efficient, effective, and robust anti-corruption 
measures to reduce corruption and attract more FDI 
inflows. In addition, an improvement in a country’s 
CPI ranking will significantly improve the country’s 
attractiveness to foreign investors, and hence large 
inflows of FDI. As a result, policymakers should give 
corruption as a feature in their investment policies 
some great attention. This might mean even going a 
step further by incorporating anti-corruption measures 
in all policies, giving much attention to those policies 
directly or indirectly linked to investment. Lastly, 
SADC countries should strive to support international 
approaches to deal with corruption. This might mean 
incorporating international anti-corruption strategies 
into domestic laws. SADC countries should design 
sound macroeconomic policies that are consistent and 
predictable in promoting international trade. 
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The CPI used to measure corruption may not be 
ideal because it collects data on corruption perceptions 
based on surveys and questionnaires, which are 
subjective. As a result, it is difficult to collect 
information on every corrupt action. Hence, detailed 
research on more accurate corruption indices, 
particularly for SADC, would help in future research. 
Furthermore, the CPI used in this research is an 
aggregate measure of corruption, and using it in 
analyzing the impact of corruption on FDI may give 
biased results. It is suggested that further research on 
this critical topic can be conducted using the diverse 
types or forms of corruption so that those types that 
negatively affect FDI can be disclosed. This will help 
in developing effective targeted anti-corruption 
strategies that will improve the appeal of a country to 
foreign investment. Further research could be 
conducted on the impact of corruption on FDI that 
flows to each sector of the economy.  
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